Christopher Candy
April 6, 2001
'... for, hearing that the King of England's son had been crowned and confirmed in the kingdom, and that his father, who had yielded to them their country free, together with a large part of the English march, had been deposed and was detained in custody, they invaded England...'1
So wrote the Lanercost chronicler of the Scottish forces that advanced southwards in 1327 to raid Northumberland and county Durham. The irony is that Isabella and Mortimer, the regents for Edward III then in control of the country, would be the ones to carry through what the chronicler had condemned Edward II for - the yielding of English rights over Scotland.
This paper will give an overview of the various efforts taken by the regency of Isabella and Mortimer to strengthen the north, in terms of the economics of the region and military responses to the Scottish threat. It will also address whether these policies differed from those Edward II undertook, and whether those policies were any more effective.
Isabella and Mortimer had sailed from Dordrecht with a force of Hainaulters on 23 September 1326, landing at Orwell in Suffolk and rapidly gained control of the country, despite attempts to resist from the Earl of Winchester, Hugh Despencer the Elder at Bristol. By 16 November, the coup was complete; Edward and the younger Despencer had been taken at Neath Abbey. The young Edward III had already been declared keeper of the realm on 26 October, and by 25 January 1327 was ruling as king.2
At first glance, the regency was eager to take steps to deal with the problem of defending the North. Many of the supporters that had brought Isabella and Mortimer back so successfully from exile were the Disinherited, with major claims in Scotland and interests in the North. If the political support of such men as Henry Beaumont, his brother Louis, and those others whose personal wealth and power were based in the north had been key in toppling Edward II, it was only fair return for the regency to try to defend the regions that had provided such support.
Certainly, the region seemed in dire need of help. The damage that had been done to the region during the previous reign was considerable, and is reflected by the large volume of debt remissions, allowances, pardons, and respites granted throughout the north during the three years of the regency. Though the last deep Scottish incursion during Edward II's reign occurred in 1322, the region was years in rebuilding from the repeated wasting of its croplands, herds, and structures.3 As early in the regency as 12 February 1327, the counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and the cities of Newcastle and Carlisle were pardoned their debts at the exchequer.4
Several others in a similar vein followed this initial grant. March 6th saw £80 from the Carlisle farm pardoned, while the men of Corbridge received the pontage from the bridge there for five years for its repair on March 16th.5 Several individuals, such as John de Clavering, Gilbert de Toutheby, John de Wysham, and Richard Marshal received either pardons on debts or yearly incomes from the exchequer due to the damage done to their lands, wardships, and offices.6 Large numbers of respites were issued for the various northern counties for debts not cancelled or pardoned, while the criminal fines for Lancashire were cancelled outright in recognition of the damages done there.7
The city of Newcastle received special attention, being along with Carlisle the main base for resisting the Scottish incursions in the north. Along with the February debt relief, the city received two years' pardon for the revenues of the city farm to the exchequer for wall repairs on August 19th and £201 6s. 8d. in further farm revenues pardoned due to the city's efforts in defence from the Scots in 1329.8 The city was also exempted from the loan on wool in 1327.9 Farther north along the coast, the town of Bamburgh was another recipient of royal favour, with several respites and pardons of debts beginning in September 1327.10
Clerical establishments did not escape either the negative attention of Scottish raiders or the following acknowledgements of their distress. The abbey of St. Mary's in York was granted relief of £170 15s. 9d. due to the ravaging of its lands, along with being allowed to stretch out the payments on its remaining debts at a rate of £100 per year.11 The archdiocese of York received several writs ordering the revaluation of the properties within its boundaries and that the clerical tenth be collected at the new levels.12 The bishopric of Carlisle was pardoned the clerical tenth outright due to the damage done.13 Commissioners were also appointed to determine the charters and muniments stolen by the Scots from the abbey of Ellerton in Yorkshire and replace them.14
In tandem with the need to get the north into better financial shape was the need to strengthen it militarily so as to avoid further damages from raiding. This need was emphasized all too clearly by the coronation day assault on Norham Castle by the Scots on 1 February 1327.15 Though the attack itself was ignored, appointments of commanders for the border marches were made. Anthony de Lucy was appointed keeper of Carlisle from February 5th until Whitsunday (May 31), while Henry de Percy was given the custody of the marches of Scotland for the same period. Keepers were appointed to the royal castles in the region, examples being Robert Horncliffe entrusted with Bamburgh and Roger Mauduit receiving Wark-on-Tweed.16 Further, Henry de Percy, Ralph de Neville, Roger Heron, William Rydell, and Gilbert de Boroughdon were given power to maintain the truce with the Scots.17
From this evidence, we are provided with a neat picture of a new political administration having taken over the country and immediately moving to rectify the errors of the previous reign. Edward II had been seen as indifferent to the needs of the north of England, if not ready to turn over the region to the Scots as the Lanercost chronicler supposed.18 Contrast this with the flurry of activity on the part of Isabella and Mortimer, up to the raising of an army including Hainaulter mercenaries to fight the Weardale campaign in June of 1327.19 But how accurate is this picture? Though the chroniclers later decry the Treaty of Northampton and the regency's apparent greed in securing it, initially the magnates of England seem supportive of the regency - if only in comparison to Edward II. But were the measures undertaken by Isabella and Mortimer innovative or novel? Did the regency herald a better situation for the north, or was it business as usual?
There is some debate regarding the speed of recovery of the region from the raids of the Scots during Edward II's reign and the claim of damages from their depredations to avoid taxation. For the purposes of the regency, the actual reality had little to do with the perception that the North had been neglected and required whatever financial help it could get. Since the legitimacy of the regency's displacement of Edward II depended in part upon accusing Edward of incompetence in defending the North and colluding with the Scots, concrete, public effort had to be made to contrast Isabella and Mortimer from the previous regime. Giving respites and pardons of debts to northern burgesses, magnates, and clerical institutions provided a happy marriage of political patronage and strengthening the legitimacy of the regency during the time when a Scottish invasion was a threat, rather than a reality. In July 1327, the Scots under James Douglas and the earl of Moray invaded England, advancing into county Durham, burning and pillaging as they went before returning unscathed to Scotland. After this calamity, there was no question that the respites and pardons of debts had become a necessity.
Despite the perceived neglect of the North by Edward II, the various remits, pardons, and respites from debt that were granted by the regency had nearly all been anticipated by him. The town of Bamburgh, for instance, received respite from its debts in February 1325, after having its previous debts acquitted in March of the previous year.20 The town of Newcastle was pardoned £100 of its farm in 1325 to help in the fortification of the town, much like the grant given in August 1327 by the regency.21 These allowances all followed a general respite from all debts for the counties of Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmoreland until further orders given in December 1325 by the king.22
If the financial side was to be so similarly prosecuted in both regimes, what about the military? Surely there would be some changes in the military administration, as the regency attempted to promote its supporters in the region and lessen the importance of those in the north who had supported Edward II in the past. If anything, the regency turned to the men whom Edward II had relied on to secure the north. Anthony de Lucy was the key man behind Andrew Harclay's arrest and was sheriff of Cumberland for the rest of Edward II's reign, along with being keeper of the king's truce with the Scots.23 Rather than removing him, the regency confirmed him as keeper of Carlisle and sheriff of Cumberland. He received £500 for custody of Carlisle through the end of May 1327, though was paid only in victuals for the £369 7s 1d owed him for the custody from June through September 7th.24
In the east, such linchpins as Henry Percy, who received orders to repair Alnwick in 1326, was commissioned to keep the peace and the truce in Northumberland in 1325, and was commissioner of the array in Yorkshire in 1326, are kept in place and confirmed in their positions.25 Percy's appointment as chief warden of the march came with the expenses of maintaining the force required to carry out his duties: a fixed fee of one thousand marks was paid for him to serve from the beginning of the reign to Whit-Sunday.26 Roger Mauduit, the keeper of the Umfraville lands in the north after the Earl of Angus' death, was keeper of Wark in 1327.27 Though Mauduit was removed as keeper of the Umfraville lands, he was replaced by the sheriff of Northumberland during 1323-4, Gilbert de Boroughdon.28
All five individuals granted the power to keep the truce with the Scots by Isabella and Mortimer had served in some capacity with the previous reign. Henry Percy's role has already been mentioned. Ralph Neville was supervisor of array for the North Riding of Yorkshire and later supervised the array of troops from Northumberland for Edward II's war in Gascony.29 Roger Heron was constable of Dunstanburgh Castle, in the crown's hands after Thomas Lancaster's defeat.30 William Rydell served on previous commissions to keep the truce and to keep the peace in the north with Percy and Neville and was supervising the array in Northumberland by 1326.31 Gilbert de Boroughdon as mentioned previously was sheriff of Northumberland under Edward II.32 Heron and Boroughdon had both served with Rydell on several previous commissions to preserve the truce, as early as 1320.33
Isabella and Mortimer had run up against the classic problem: how to provide the strength and effectiveness to adequately defend the north? The options available boiled down to four separate solutions, all of which were attempted by the regency. The first was to depend on the local magnates and population to defend itself. As seen, the regency heavily exploited this option, and would have regardless of what other actions it may have taken. It made sense to have men who knew the region, knew each other, and knew the opposition actively engaged in trying to defend what was their home ground.
The difficulties with this scheme were the same ones facing Edward II when he attempted to use this strategy: there simply were not enough magnates who were effective enough or powerful enough to defend the north on their own without help from outside of the northern counties. Even Andrew Harclay, noted (and ennobled) for his efforts on the border, was incapable of stopping the Scottish raids. Edward II was seen as having let the north defend itself, and the results of this and his general actions regarding Scotland were one of the reasons behind his downfall. To secure the north, other means had to be used.
If the north could not hold on by itself, the second option was for the king to go north to make sure that it held. Summons to Newcastle for 18 May with their troops were issued to the magnates on 5 April 1327, followed later in the month by the calling up of foot soldiers from London and 42 towns on the 25th.34 As with Edward I, criminals were pardoned provided they served in the army. John of Hainault, the brother of the Count of Hainault whose mercenaries had helped depose Edward II, was persuaded to return with a large body of mercenaries to join the campaign as well. By 23 May, Edward III was in York, his army gathering there for the anticipated fight with the Scots.
The resultant campaign of 1327 is well known through the writings of Jean le Bel, later copied by Jean Froissart. The royal army, wracked by dissension between the Hainaulters and the archers of the northern counties even before the campaign commenced, was unable to prevent a Scottish force under James Douglas and the Earl of Moray from raiding its way down from Scotland into the bishopric of Durham, before escaping home. Even when the ungainly English forces had finally come face-to-face with the much more mobile Scots at Stanhope Park, they were unable to force a conflict where their superior numbers could tell.
The only tangible result of the campaign was debt - lots of it. The largest debts of the regency outside household operations were those owed to John of Hainault, the uncle of Queen Philippa. Several thousand pounds in wages were owed to the magnate due to his participation both in the coup that ushered in the regency and the failed Weardale campaign. Additionally, John had been granted on 7 February 1327 one thousand marks out of the customs of London for his services. Despite paying £40,540 12s 5 3/4d towards the large arrears in wages, the crown still had to acknowledge £14,406 6s 8d in debt to John in March 1328, with the two halves to be paid by the end of the year.35
Both the Bardi bank of Florence and the merchant de la Pole brothers of Hull loaned funds to pay for John's wages, though the Bardi were by far the greater lenders for this purpose. The de la Poles loaned £2001 5s 11d in late August to help pay John,36 while the Bardi loaned £900 in September and took on the responsibility of paying John the £14,406 6s 8d acknowledged as owed to him in March 1328.37 Since the crown had used all sorts of expedients including pledging the crown jewels to raise funds for paying John, the intervention of both foreign and domestic lenders was indispensable in making it possible to pay John.38
The wages owed by the regency to native soldiers serving in defence of the march was also sizeable. For example, pay to Henry Percy were in arrears as far back as Edward I's reign for his father's services,39 and the resumption of hostilities only added to this total. In addition to Percy's stipend as warden of the march, the expenses of the Weardale campaign incurred further debts: September 1327 saw him being paid £330 3s 4d for himself, 159 men at arms and 200 hobelars during the abortive campaign.40 However, a compromise was found for paying Percy the mounting amounts due him: in August 1328 he was granted the right to be quit of rents from the wardships he held for the amounts he was owed rather than make the mutual payments both parties owed one another.41 Several other lords such as Roger de Swynnerton, Thomas de Weston, Thomas de Corbridge, and the Earl of Norfolk also received allowances, grants, or other recompensation.42 Had the campaign been successful, these costs would have been offset by the benefits of victory. However, the lack of results merely made the use of the royal army even more damaging to the regency than had it never gone north.
The inconclusiveness of the Weardale campaign meant that the appointment of competent officers was of even more importance than before the royal army's arrival in the north. Both Henry de Percy and Anthony de Lucy continued in their posts, while various nobles such as Hugh de Turplington, John de Multon, and Robert de Watevill receiving writs of protection during their stays in the border region.43 These men were faced with the Scots' continued efforts to subdue Northumberland. Henry Percy was besieged in Alnwick for a fortnight, while Warkworth and Norham also came under assault.44
Though the campaign was ineffective in protecting the north, it did give the impression of a willingness to engage the Scots. Though Edward II was seen as unwilling to do anything for the north, he did arrange for campaigns to deal with threatened Scottish invasions and to invade Scotland itself in 1310, 1314, 1319, and 1322 - after which a negotiated truce in 1323 made further campaigning not an option. Further preparations had been made in 1308, 1309,1316, 1317, 1318 and 1323 for northern campaigns, though various combinations of foreign and domestic politics had prevented actual military action during these years.45 It was more Edward II's inability to accomplish anything with his campaigns north that created his reputation than the lack of campaigns. In this light, the Weardale campaign was a dire prediction of how the regency would fare should it see continued conflict on the northern border.
The third solution was to call on men from the southern parts of the kingdom to come north with men and either take over the defence of the area or supplement the troops already there. Edward II had certainly tried to do this, calling at various times upon Thomas Lancaster, Aymer de Valence, Edmund FitzAlan, John de Cromwell and Robert de Umfraville to bring large numbers of troops northward.46 While supporters of the regency such as Hugh de Turplington, John de Multon, and Robert de Watevill did come north to stay in the region, receiving protection from lawsuits to do so, there was not the major movement of troops north by southern magnates that might have been expected.
The earls of Lancaster and Kent did receive commissions as captains of the English army in the March of Scotland, and took a force to Newcastle including a number of the Disinherited; however, the commission is dated June 6, and indicates a need to bolster the regional defence due to the delay of the royal army, not from these lords having been convinced to remain in the area without direct royal military assistance being forthcoming.47 Once the royal army had disbanded, most magnates from the south returned home. The earl of Kent was the only major magnate to stay in the region longer, receiving a writ of protection in October 1327 - the same period of time that saw Robert the Bruce besieging Norham Castle.
The final solution available to the regency was the most humiliating - negotiating a peace with the Scots. Any attempts to create a permanent peace of this sort would require an acknowledgement of Robert the Bruce's claim to king of Scotland, free of any claims of sovereignty by the English Crown. Diplomacy had been ongoing from the very beginning of the regency: Ivo de Aldeburgh, the constable of Barnard Castle in county Durham, was commissioned in December 1326 to treat with the Scots, acting in that capacity throughout the first half of the year.48 On 25 April 1327, he received an appointment to arrange safe-passage of ambassadors from Scotland to arrange a peace.49
However, these discussions had not had any success by the time of the Weardale campaign. Once the military option had been tried and found wanting, diplomacy became the only means for peace available to the regency with any chance of success. Norham, Warkworth, and Alnwick were all besieged by the Scots in the last half of 1327, though none fell. Letters in the fall from the king to John Darcy, then sheriff of York, and to the supervisors of the array in seven northern counties indicated the belief that Robert the Bruce intended to fortify his men in Northumberland and hold it permanently.50 Archbishop Melton of York expressed the same belief in letters to Lewis Beaumont, claiming Bruce had already been granting parts of Northumberland to his vassals.51 No campaign in the north was forthcoming; despite ordering the able-bodied men of the north to prepare for campaign in October, the regency was in no position to move again to conflict.52
Both Stones and Nicholson have covered in detail the diplomacy of the following six months.53 William Denholme and Henry Percy were sent to negotiate with Bruce on 9 October. A flurry of negotiations ensued, with preliminary points of discussion for a full treaty fleshed out by the end of October and ambassadors for the final negotiations appointed by 23 November.54 Truce was arranged to allow for the necessary diplomacy to be carried out. By 1 March, matters had advanced far enough that Edward issued his formal quitclaim of his rule and superiority over Scotland, in excruciating and exact detail.55 Immediately after, delegates for the English crown left for Edinburgh, to treat for the first time with the Scots in Scotland. The final details were hammered out by 17 March, and agreed to by the Scottish parliament. The English parliament ratified the treaty themselves at Northampton on 4 May 1328, leading to peace and a Scottish king recognized by the English for the first time since John Balliol.56
The treaty, known as the 'Shameful Peace', provided for alliance between the two countries, the lifting of the excommunication for Bruce, the marriage of Edward's sister Joan to Robert's son David, and a payment of £20,000 to the English king to sweeten the deal. Unfortunately, the deal was tart enough that no payoff would make it acceptable to certain parties - the king being foremost amongst them. Politically dominated by Isabella and Mortimer, Edward was in no position to block the treaty from going forward. However, his absolute refusal to attend his sister's wedding was keenly felt on both sides of the border. Though Nicholson indicates that the lack of dowry from the English was an insult to Bruce, the agreement made at Edinburgh indicates that the Scots themselves had taken on the responsibility for providing £2,000 worth of lands as dower, which Roger Mauduit and Robert de Tughale were empowered to receive on her behalf on 21 May 1328.57 The lack of Edward's attendance was insult enough, and matched in turn by Robert the Bruce's absence.
The treaty received little favour in the eye of the English chroniclers, receiving near universal condemnation. Geoffrey le Baker wrote of the 'disgraceful peace made between the English and the Scots', while the author of the Brut called the parliament at Northampton 'accursed'.58 The Scottish chroniclers, by contrast, react positively to both the treaty and the marriage. Walter Bower, in his Scotichronicon, lists the full text of Edward's quitclaim to Scotland, notes the £20,000 payment to be made by Robert and the Scots to Edward, and the agreement to the wedding.59 Much more ado is made regarding the death of Robert the Bruce than regarding the treaty with the English, though the author does mention how Bruce 'vanquished the king and people of England with such courage and forcefulness that they established a pretended peace with him only out of fear for their other kingdoms.'60
The £20,000 payment by the Scots did little to increase happiness with the treaty. Instead, it increased the resentment of Isabella and Mortimer. It was never returned in any fashion to the northern counties from where it had been bled during the previous reign. Initially, it was assigned towards paying the huge debts owed to John of Hainault and the Bardi of Florence, as mentioned. However, the exchequer was forced to find the funds elsewhere when Isabella selfishly reassigned the Scottish payment to herself.61 It is little wonder that the treaty was so disliked when the one tangible gain on the part of the English ended up enriching the individuals seen as betraying the country.
Though Edward II had found himself negotiating truces with the Scots, including a thirteen-year truce at Bishopthorpe in May 1323, even he had refused to budge on the issue of English sovereignty over Scotland. The truce provided for occupied territory to be surrendered, new fortifications not already begun in the March to be banned, and restriction of contact between subjects of the two sides of the conflict. What it did not address in the slightest was the issue of whether Robert the Bruce was due the title of king.
Simply put, no English king was going on his own merits to give away his claims to Scotland. Such a diminution was not to be accepted, certainly not by choice. The only way this could happen would be if the king was forced to, either through disastrous defeats or by not controlling his own fate. Even Bannockburn was not able to convince Edward II to back down and grant Robert what he wished... but Isabella and Mortimer had full and total control of the political direction of the crown at the time of the Treaty of Northampton. They personally were losing nothing by bargaining away the king's sovereignty over Scotland. Only Edward III, helpless to do much more than fume, was going to lose by their acceding to the Scottish demands.
In conclusion, Isabella and Mortimer had benefited from and taken full advantage of Edward II's perceived indifference to northern England. However, the perception of activity was at variance with the reality of what was being done for the North. This is not to say that Edward II was effective in dealing with the northern problems - the chroniclers seem fully justified in their upset at years of devastation and destruction visited on the north before the Truce of Bishopthorpe was concluded in 1323. While the regents may have engaged in a great deal of visible activity for the North, none of it was innovative or new. All the policies that Edward II had pursued - respites and pardons of debts to help financially, commissioning local magnates to defend the North, royal campaigns to crush Scottish opposition, the appointment of major magnates from the south as captains on the march, and the negotiation of truces - all of these were tried in quick succession by the regents, with little success.
It is a sad irony that the only means that Isabella and Mortimer were able to use to create a peace with the Scots was the one guaranteed to generate conflict in the near future. The Treaty of Northampton left the regency with the first solid peace in the north since the time of the Edward I's adjudication between Balliol and Bruce for the Scottish crown, and Isabella greatly richer. It also left a body of deeply dissatisfied nobles with unfulfilled claims in Scotland; only Henry de Percy had received satisfaction in terms of his Scottish claims, and there he gained only the right to regain his father's forfeited titles through the courts.62 It also left a deeply dissatisfied monarch willing to take advantage of events as they turned to regain those rights he felt he had unfairly lost when the opportunity presented itself. Twenty-one months after the removal of Mortimer at the Nottingham parliament of October, 1330, Edward Balliol and many of the Disinherited including Henry Beaumont, claimant to the earldom of Buchan, David Strathbolgie, claimant to the earldom of Atholl, Thomas Wake of Liddell, and Gilbert Umfraville, heir to the earldom of Angus, sailed from Yorkshire with the tacit approval of Edward III to attack Scotland in support of Balliol's claim to the crown. The resultant confrontation led to the Scottish defeat at Dupplin Moor and another round of war between English and Scot.
1 Lanercost, p 256
2 McKisack, May. The Fourteenth Century: 1307-1399,
pp 83-90
3 For more information on the wasting of the north, see Colm
McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328,
especially p 72-123
4 CPR 1327-30, p 23
5 CPR 1327-30, p 32, 35
6 CPR 1327-30, p 15, 171, 461; CCR 1327-30, p
2, 166, etc.
7 CCR 1327-30, p 6, 59, 294 , 72
8 CPR 1327-30, p 146, 461
9 CCR 1327-30, p 162
10 CPR 1327-30, p 169; CCR 1327-30, p 265, 387
11 CCR 1327-30, p 54, 66
12 CCR 1327-30, p 188, 191, 280, 307, 325,
13 CCR 1327-30, p 48
14 CPR 1327-30, p 207
15 Lanercost, p 258-9
16 CFR 1327-37, p 24; Nicholson, R. Edward III and
the Scots (Oxford, 1965) p 15
17 CPR 1327-30, p 6, 18, 15
18 Lanercost, pp 256-7
19 CCR 1327-30, p 118; Rot. Scot. I, pp 210,
211
20 CCR 1323-7, pp 262, 71
21 CCR 1323-7, p 432; CPR 1327-30, p 146
22 CCR 1323-7, p 439
23 CDS v3, #885
24 Nicholson, R. Edward III and the Scots (Oxford, 1965)
p 15; CPR 1327-30, p 164
25 CPR 1324-7, pp 303, 228, 220; CCR 1323-7,
p 457
26 Nicholson, R. Edward III and the Scots (Oxford, 1965)
p 16
27 CPR 1327-30, p 163; CCR 1323-7, p 485; CFR
1327-37, p 24
28 CCR 1327-30, p 259; CCR 1323-7, pp 99, 272;
Blair, C.H. 'The Sheriffs of Northumberland, Part I (1076-1602)', Archaeologia
Aeliana 20, 4th series (1942) p 43
29 CPR 1324-7, pp 9, 53
30 CCR 1323-7, p 12
31 CPR 1324-7, pp 162, 221, 228
32 CCR 1323-7, pp 9, 272
33 CPR 1317-21, pp 416, 459; CPR 1324-7, pp 113,
228
34 CCR 1327-30, p 118
35 CPR 1327-30, p 10, 247
36 CPR 1327-30, p 165
37 CPR 1327-30, p 247, 254; CCR 1327-30, p 463,
470
38 CCR 1327-30, p 160
39 CCR 1327-30, p 2
40 CPR 1327-30, p 163
41 CPR 1327-30, p 309
42 CCR 1327-30, p 160, 172, 264; CPR 1327-30,
p 145
43 CPR 1327-30, p 102, 107, 114
44 Nicholson, p 44
45 Colm McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England
and Ireland, 1306-1328, pp 124-5
46 see McNamee, C; The Wars of the Bruces, pp 147-52
47 Rot. Scot. I, p 213
48 CCR 1323-6, p 624; CPR 1327-30, pp 25, 33
49 CPR 1327-30, p 95
50 Rot. Scot. I, pp 221-2
51 J. Raine, Historical Papers and Letters from Northern
Registers, Rolls Series, pp 344-6, 349-50
52 Rot. Scot. I, pp 221,222
53 See E.L.G. Stones, 'The Anglo-Scottish Negotiations of 1327',
SHR 30 (1951), pp 49-54; E.L.G. Stones, 'The English Mission to Edinburgh
in 1328', SHR 28 (1949), pp 121-32; R.A. Nicholson, Edward III and
the Scots (Oxford, 1965), pp 46-56
54 Rot. Scot. I, p 223; Stones, E.L.G. Anglo-Scottish
Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents (London, 1965) pp 158-160
55 Foedera, ii. ii, pp 730; Stones, E.L.G. Anglo-Scottish
Relations, 1174-1328: Some Selected Documents (London, 1965) pp 161-63
56 Foedera, ii. ii, pp 740-42
57 Stones, E.L.G. Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some
Selected Documents (London, 1965) pp 165; CPR 1327-30, p 272
58 Chronicon Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, ed. E.M.
Thompson (Oxford, 1889), p 40; The Brut or The Chronicles of England,
I, ed. Friedrich W.D. Brie (London, 1906), p 258
59 Scotichronicon by Walter Bower, v 7, ed. D.E.R. Watt
and A.B. Scott (Aberdeen, 1996) pp 38-9
60 ibid, p 45
61 CPR 1327-30, p 418, 470, CCR 1327-30, p 470,
490; Foedera II. ii. p 477, 485
62 Stones, E.L.G. Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174-1328: Some
Selected Documents (London, 1965) p 171
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